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Abstract We introduce the ‘‘ball-catching task’’, a novel computerized task,
which combines a tangible action (‘‘catching balls’’) with induced material cost of
effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to
manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which
permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-
rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort
provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from
three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament,
using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from
experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task
combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is
useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.
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1 Introduction
Experiments using real effort tasks enjoy increasing popularity among experimental
economists. Some frequently used tasks include, for instance, number-addition tasks
(e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)), counting-zero tasks (e.g., Abeler et al.
(2011)) and slider-positioning tasks (Gill and Prowse 2012).1 In this paper, we
present a novel computerized task, called the ‘‘ball-catching task’’, which combines
a tangible activity in the lab with induced material cost of effort.2 In the task, a
subject has a fixed amount of time to catch balls that fall randomly from the top of
the screen by using mouse clicks to move a tray at the bottom of the screen. Control
over the cost of effort is achieved by attaching material costs to mouse clicks that
move the tray.
The ball-catching task shares an advantage of real effort tasks in that subjects are
required to do something tangible in order to achieve a level of performance, as
opposed to simply choosing a number (as is done in experiments that implement
cost of effort functions using a pure induced value method, where different number
choices are directly linked with different financial costs). A drawback, however, of
existing real effort tasks is that in using them the researcher sacrifices considerable
control over the cost of effort function. As noted by Falk and Fehr (2003): ‘‘while
‘real effort’ surely adds realism to the experiment, one should also note that it is
realized at the cost of losing control. Since the experimenter does not know the
workers’ effort cost, it is not possible to derive precise quantitative predictions’’ (p.
404). Incorporating material effort costs re-establishes a degree of control over
effort costs and, as we shall demonstrate, allows researchers to manipulate
observable effort costs and to make point predictions on effort provision.
Here, we report three studies aimed to evaluate the ball-catching task. In Study 1,
we examine individual performance on the ball-catching task under piece-rate
incentives. Subjects incur a cost for each mouse click and receive a prize for each
ball caught. We first show that clicking behavior corresponds closely to comparative
static predictions derived from piece-rate incentive theory. We then estimate the
relationship between clicks and catches and use this to predict how the number of
clicks will vary as the costs of clicking and the benefits of catching are manipulated.
We find that the number of mouse clicks is close to the predicted number of clicks.
These findings also add to the literature on empirical testing of incentive theories
(Prendergast 1999) by presenting experimental evidence on a tangible task
supporting basic piece-rate incentive theory. By comparison, the prominent field
1 To our knowledge, one of the first experimental studies to use a real effort task for testing incentive
theory is Dickinson (1999) in which subjects were asked to type paragraphs in a four-day period. Other
early studies implementing real effort tasks within typical laboratory experiments include van Dijk et al.
(2001), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Gneezy (2002), Konow (2000).
2 The z-Tree code as well as a demonstration video for the ball-catching task are downloadable from the
journal website (supplementary materials to this article). Researchers are free to use this code (with
appropriate attribution).
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evidence reported by Lazear (2000) and lab evidence provided by Dickinson (1999)
support comparative static predictions of basic incentive theory, whereas we show
that in the ball-catching task the theory also predicts activity levels (number of
clicks) accurately.
In Study 2, we demonstrate how the task can be implemented in some classic
experiments. We administer the task in experiments used to study cooperation,
fairness and competition, namely, team production (e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter
(1997)), gift exchange (e.g., Fehr et al. (1993)) and a tournament (e.g., Bull et al.
(1987)). In all three experiments, the results reproduce the stylized findings from
previous experiments that used purely induced values. Moreover, behavior also
follows equilibrium point predictions closely in those experiments where point
predictions are available.
In Study 3, we introduce an online version of the ball-catching task and conduct
the same experiment as in Study 1 using Amazon Mechanical Turk workers as
participants. Comparative statics results are replicated, which we view as an
important robustness check. Behavior is noisier than in the lab, however, which
most likely is due to the more varied decision environment online compared to the
lab.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe the
ball-catching task. In Sects. 3–5 we report the three studies using the task. Section 6
provides a comprehensive discussion of the results of our three studies. Section 7
concludes.
2 The ball-catching task
The lab version of the ball-catching task is a computerized task programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and requires subjects to catch falling balls by moving a
tray on their computer screens. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the task. In the
middle of the screen there is a rectangular task box with four hanging balls at the top
and one tray at the bottom. Once a subject presses the ‘‘Start the task’’ button at the
lower right corner of the screen, the balls will fall from the top of the task box. In the
version used in this paper, the timer starts and balls fall one after another in a fixed
time interval. Balls fall at random in each column. The software allows adjusting the
speed of falling balls and the time interval between falling balls. It is also possible to
change the number of ‘columns’ (i.e., the number of hanging balls) and fix a falling
pattern rather than a random one. As will be discussed later, flexibility in all these
parameters will allow tight control over the production function in this task, that is,
the relationship between the number of balls caught and the number of clicks made.
To catch the falling balls, the subject can move the tray by mouse clicking the
‘‘LEFT’’ or ‘‘RIGHT’’ buttons below the task box. At the top of the screen, the
number of balls caught (CATCHES) and the number of clicks made (CLICKS) are
updated in real time. We will take the number of clicks as our observable measure
of ‘‘effort’’. As will become clear later, we acknowledge that other forms of effort
(e.g., concentration, deliberation) may be exerted by the subject in this task.
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Our subjects work on a task that, like all real effort tasks, involves a tangible
activity. However, two features distinguish our implementation of the ball-catching
task from most real effort tasks: (i) it is approximately costless in terms of physical
and cognitive costs required by the task, whereas most real effort tasks involve
unobservable physical or cognitive costs; (ii) costs are induced by attaching
pecuniary costs to mouse clicks, which implies that, unlike in most real effort tasks,
costs are under the control of the experimenter.3 By specifying the relation between
clicks and pecuniary costs we can implement any material cost of effort function.
The most convenient specification might be to use a linear cost function by simply
attaching a constant cost to every mouse click, but it is also possible to specify
nonlinear cost functions (we will present an example in Sect. 4.2). In the example of
Fig. 1 the subjects incurs a cost of 5 tokens for each mouse click. Accumulated costs
(EXPENSE) are updated and displayed in real time. It is also possible to attach
pecuniary benefits to catches. In Fig. 1 the subject receives 20 tokens for each ball
caught and accumulated benefits (SCORE) are updated on screen in real time.
In existing real effort tasks output and effort are typically indistinguishable. In
the ball-catching task there is clear distinction between the catches and the clicks
variables, with the natural interpretation being that the former represents output and
the latter input. Moreover, by choosing the time constraint, ball speed, etc., the
researcher has flexibility in selecting the production technology.
Fig. 1 A screenshot of the ball-catching task
3 In our implementation subjects have a short amount of time in which to click and catch balls (one
minute in Study 1). One could also implement the ball-catching task in a way that increases physical and
cognitive costs and is perhaps more ‘‘effortful’’, for example by increasing the time frame within which
balls are caught.
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Evidence collected in a post-experimental questionnaire suggests that subjects
find the ball-catching task easy to understand and learn. In the next section we
examine in more detail how subjects perform on the task under piece-rate
incentives. In Sect. 5 we present a version of the ball-catching task that can be used
for online experiments.
3 Study 1: testing the ball-catching task under piece-rate incentives
3.1 Experimental design and comparative static predictions
Study 1 examined performance on the ball-catching task under piece-rate
incentives. Each subject worked on the same ball-catching task for 36 periods.
Each period lasted 60 s.4 In each period one combination of prize-per-catch (either
10 or 20 tokens) and cost-per-click (0, 5 or 10 tokens) was used, giving six
treatments that are varied within subjects (see Table 1). We chose a within-subject
design to be able to observe reactions to changes in incentives at an individual level.
The first 6 periods, one period of each treatment in random order, served as practice
periods for participants to familiarize themselves with the task. Token earnings from
these periods were not converted to cash. The following 30 periods, five periods of
each treatment in completely randomized order (i.e., unblocked and randomized),
were paid out for real. In all, 64 subjects participated in the experiment with average
earnings of £13.80 for a session lasting about 1 h.5
Given a particular piece-rate incentive, how often would subjects click? Basic
piece-rate theory assumes that subjects trade off the costs and benefits of clicking in
order to maximize expected utility. Assume that utility is increasing in the financial
rewards, which are given by PQ Ce, where Q is the number of catches and e is the
number of clicks, and assume the relationship between Q and e is given by
q ¼ f e; eð Þ, where f is a production function with f
0
[ 0 and f
00
\0, and e is a
random shock uncorrelated with the number of clicks. Given these assumptions the
expected utility maximizing number of clicks satisfies:
e ¼ f 0
C
P
 
: ð1Þ
This analysis posits a stochastic production function linking individual catches
and clicks, and so an individual’s optimal number of clicks may vary from trial to
trial as the marginal product of a click varies from trial to trial. This may reflect
variability in the exact pattern of falling balls from trial to trial. We also recognize
that the marginal product function might vary systematically across individuals. To
make predictions at the aggregate level, we will estimate the production function (in
4 Unless otherwise stated, in the version of the ball-catching task we use in this paper a maximum of 52
balls can be caught within 60 s.
5 The experiment was run in two sessions at the CeDEx lab at the University of Nottingham with subjects
recruited using the online campus recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Experimental instructions
and data can be found in the online supplementary materials.
Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the…
123
Sect. 3.3) allowing for individual specific random effects and then use this estimate,
evaluated at the mean of the random effects, along with our incentive parameters to
predict the average optimal number of clicks. Before we proceed to this estimation,
we discuss some features of the optimal number of clicks and how they relate to our
experimental design.
The first feature to note is that the optimal number of clicks is homogeneous of
degree zero in C and P. That is, a proportionate change in both input and output
prices leaves the optimal number of clicks unchanged. This feature reflects the
assumption that there are no other unobserved inputs or outputs associated with
working on the task that generate cognitive or psychological costs or benefits. In fact
we can think of two plausible types of unobservable inputs/outputs. First, output may
be a function of cognitive effort as well as the number of clicks. For example, output
may depend not just on how many clicks a subject makes, but also on how
intelligently a subject uses her clicks. If the production function is given by
f e; j; eð Þ, where j represents cognitive effort, then e will reflect a trade-off
between e and j. If all input and output prices were varied in proportion (including
the ‘‘price’’ of j), the optimal number of clicks would be unaffected. However, a
proportionate change in just C and P would affect e. If e and j are substitute inputs
then a proportionate increase in C and P will result in a decrease in e as the subject
substitutes more expensive clicking with more careful thinking. Second, subjects
may enjoy additional psychological benefits from catching balls. For example,
suppose that in addition to the pecuniary costs and benefits there is a non-monetary
benefit from a catch, and suppose this psychological benefit is worth B money-units
per catch. Again, proportionate changes in P, C and B would leave optimal effort
unchanged, but a change in just P and C would not. Maximization of ðPþ BÞQ Ce
implies that a proportionate increase in C and P (holding B constant) will decrease e.
Our experimental treatments allow us to test whether unobservable costs/benefits
matter compared with induced effort costs in the ball-catching task. Our design
includes two treatments that vary C and P while keeping the ratio C
P
constant
(treatments 2 and 6 in Table 1). In the absence of unobserved costs/benefits, the
distribution of clicks should be the same in these two treatments. The presence of
unobserved costs/benefits could instead lead to systematic differences. Note that
with this design the prediction that optimal clicking is homogeneous of degree zero
in C and P can be tested without the need to derive the underlying production
function, f , since all that is needed is a comparison of the distributions of clicks
between these two treatments.
A second feature of the optimal number of clicks is that, for positive costs of
clicking, the optimal number of clicks decreases with the cost-prize ratio. Our
design includes four further treatments that vary this ratio. Comparisons between
Table 1 Within-subject treatments in study 1
Treatment no. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prize per catch (P) 10 10 10 20 20 20
Cost per click (C) 0 5 10 0 5 10
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treatments with different cost-prize ratios allow simple tests of the comparative
static predictions of piece-rate theory, again without the need to estimate the
production function. The variation in incentives across treatments serves an
additional purpose: it allows us to recover a more accurate estimate of the
underlying production function over a wide range of clicks.
A final feature of the optimal solution worth noting is that when the cost-per-click
is zero optimal clicking is independent of P. In this case, since clicking is costless the
individual’s payoff increases in the number of catches, and so regardless of the prize
level the individual should simply catch as many balls as possible. Again, if there are
psychological costs/benefits associated with the task this feature will not hold.
Indeed, one could use the ball-catching task without material costs of clicking, basing
comparative static predictions (e.g. that the number of catches will increase as the
prize per catch increases) on psychological costs of effort. However, like in many
existing real effort tasks, the ball-catching task without material costs might exhibit a
‘‘ceiling effect’’, that is unresponsiveness of the number of clicks to varying prize
incentives.6 For this reason our design includes two treatments where the material
cost of clicking is zero (treatments 1 and 4 in Table 1). These allow us to test whether
there is a ceiling effect in the ball-catching task without induced clicking costs.
3.2 Comparative statics results
Figure 2 shows the distributions of clicks for each treatment, pooling over all
subjects and periods. Clear differences between panels show that clicking behavior
varies across incentive treatments. We begin by examining how these differences
relate to the comparative static predictions based on optimal clicking (1).7
Consider first the comparison between treatments 2 (P = 10, C = 5) and 6
(P = 20, C = 10). These treatments vary the financial stakeswithout altering the cost/
prize ratio. The basic piece-rate theory prediction is that this will not have a systematic
effect on clicking. As discussed in Sect. 3.1 however, unobserved psychological
costs/benefits associated with the task will lead to systematic differences between the
distributions of clicks in the two treatments.We find that the distributions of clicks are
very similar, with average clicks of 18.6 under low-stakes and 18.4 under high stakes.
Using a subject’s average clicks per treatment as the unit of observation, a Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test (p = 0.880) finds no significant difference between
treatments 2 and 6. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average number of
clicks is invariant to scaling up the financial stakes.
Next we ask whether variation in the cost-prize ratio affects clicking as predicted.
Will increasing the cost-per-click, holding the prize-per-catch constant, reduce the
number of clicks? And will the number of clicks depend on the prize level for a given
clicking cost? First, we compare the top three panels of Fig. 2, where the prize is
6 See an early review in Camerer and Hogarth (1999). Another possible reason for the ‘‘ceiling effect’’ is
that subjects may also simply work on the paid task due to some experimenter demand effects (Zizzo
2010), particularly in the absence of salient outside options (see Augusto et al. (2015), Corgnet et al.
(2015) and Eckartz (2014) for discussions).
7 We do not find any systematic change in average catches, average clicks or average earnings over the
30 periods. See the online supplementary materials for additional analysis of individual level data.
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always 10. We observe a clear shift of the distribution of the number of clicks when
moving across treatments with lowest to highest induced clicking costs. The average
number of clicks falls from 58.7 to 18.6 to 8.8 as the cost-per-click increases from 0
to 5 to 10. Friedman tests for detecting systematic differences in matched subjects’
observations, using a subject’s average clicks per treatment as the unit of
observations, show that the differences across treatments are highly significant
(p\ 0.001). A similar pattern is observed in the bottom three panels, where the prize
is always 20, and again the differences are highly significant (p\ 0.001).
Next, we perform two vertical comparisons between treatments 2 and 5 and
between treatments 3 and 6. Holding the clicking costs constant, we find that a
higher prize leads to higher number of clicks in both comparisons (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test: p\ 0.001).
Finally, a comparison between treatments 1 and 4 offers an examination of
whether a ceiling effect, observed in many real effort tasks, is present in the ball-
catching task. In these treatments the cost-per-click is zero, but the prize-per-catch
is 10 in treatment 1 and 20 in treatment 4. If there is no ‘‘real’’ psychological cost/
benefit associated with working on the task, subjects should simply catch as many
balls as possible and we should observe the same distribution of the number of
clicks in these two treatments, thus exemplifying the typical ceiling effect.
Comparing the distributions of clicks across the zero-cost treatments illustrated in
Fig. 2 suggest that distributions are very similar. Average clicks are 57.8 in the low
prize treatment and 58.7 in the high prize treatment. The closeness of average
clicking between treatments 1 and 4 is statistically supported by a Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test (p = 0.215), again using a subject’s average clicks
per treatment as the unit of observation. The sharp contrast between the strong prize
effect in treatments with induced effort costs and the absence of a prize effect in the
Fig. 2 Distributions and kernel density distributions of the number of clicks in Study 1
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zero-cost treatments illustrates that the ceiling effect can be avoided by incorpo-
rating financial costs in the ball-catching task.8
In sum, as stated in the following result, we find that the comparative static
predictions of basic piece-rate theory are borne out in the experimental data.
Result 1: The main comparative statics predictions are supported:
(1) Varying the financial stakes without altering the cost//prize ratio does not
affect clicking behavior.
(2) Increasing the cost-per-click while keeping the prize-per-catch constant
reduces the number of clicks; increasing the prize-per-catch while keeping
the cost-per-click constant increases the number of clicks.
(3) When the cost-per-click is zero, the value of the prize-per-catch does not
affect clicking behavior (ceiling effects).
Our next goal is to derive point predictions about the number of clicks in the various
treatments and to compare them to the data. To be able to do so, we next estimate the
production function, which we will then use to derive the point predictions.
3.3 The production function
Our empirical strategy for estimating the production function is to first specify a
functional form by fitting a flexible functional form to the catches-clicks data using
the full sample. Next, we estimate the production function, allowing for persistent as
well as transitory unobserved individual effects and fixed period effects. We then
test whether the production function is stable across periods and invariant to varying
prize levels. We will also examine the stability of the production function across
experimental sessions.
Figure 3 shows the observed catches-clicks data from all treatments along with a
fitted production function based on a fractional polynomial regression.9 The fitted
production function has a clear concave shape, indicating a diminishing marginal
rate of return to clicks. After a point, the production function is decreasing,
indicating that there is a ‘‘technological ceiling’’ beyond which more clicking may
actually lead to lower production levels. Observations in the decreasing range are
predominantly from the treatments with a zero cost of clicking. As one of the main
8 We also administered a post-experimental questionnaire where we asked subjects to rate the difficulty,
enjoyableness and boredom of the task. On average, subjects reported that the task was very easy to do
and they had neutral attitudes towards the enjoyableness and boredom of the task. Along with the
quantitative data on clicks and catches, these responses are consistent with our interpretation that in our
implementation of the ball-catching task psychological costs/benefits are not so important relative to
pecuniary costs/benefits.
9 Fractional polynomials, which are an alternative to conventional polynomials, can afford more
flexibility than conventional polynomials by allowing logarithms and non-integer powers in the models.
The curve-fitting procedure used in the regression selects the best-fitting model with appropriate powers
and/or logarithms. We also considered the possibility that the functional form might differ for C = 0
treatments, and so we fitted fractional polynomials excluding these data. We get the same specifications,
and very similar coefficients.
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advantages of using the ball-catching task is precisely that clicking can be made
costly, the decreasing part of the production function should be of little concern,
since with positive clicking costs the number of clicks will be within the range
where the empirical production function is concave and increasing.
Using the functional form suggested by the fractional polynomial regression, we
move on to estimate the following random coefficients panel data model:
Catchesi;r ¼ b0 þ b1Clicks
0:5
i;r þ b2Clicks
2
i;r þ dr þ xi þ ui;r
 
Clicks0:5i;r ; ð2Þ
where Catchesi;r and Clicksi;r are respectively the number of catches and the number
of clicks of subject i in period r. Period dummies dr (with the first period providing
the omitted category), an individual random effect xi with mean zero and variance
r2x, and a random error ui;r with mean zero and variance r
2
u are all assumed to be
multiplicative with Clicks0:5i;r . Our specification of multiplicative heterogeneity and
heteroskedasticity allows both persistent and transitory individual differences in the
marginal product function, which could also vary across periods. The model thus
predicts heterogeneity in clicking both across and within subjects.10 All equations
are estimated using maximum likelihood and estimates are reported in Table 2.11
Fig. 3 The relation between clicks and catches and the estimated production function. Note the first entry
in (*, *) denotes the prize per catch and the second the cost per click. The fitted production functional
form is given by Q ¼ 9:507þ 5:568e0:5  0:003e2, where Q denotes the number of catches and e the
number of clicks. The estimates of coefficients are from a fractional polynomial regression
10 The model specification of multiplicative terms with Clicks0:5i;r implies that the conditional variation in
catches is linear in clicks. We examined the relationship between clicks and squared residuals from a
simple pooled regression of the model Catchesi;r ¼ a0 þ a1Clicks
0:5
i;r þ a2Clicks
2
i;r þ pi;r . We then
regressed squared residuals on Clicksi;r as well as a nonlinear term (either Clicks
0:5
i;r or Clicks
2
i;r). The
coefficients on the nonlinear terms are not statistically significant, supporting our modelling specification
of a linear relationship between conditional variation in catches and clicks.
11 To estimate model (2), note that dividing both sides by Clicks0:5i;r transforms the model to a standard
random effects model: Catchesi;r=Clicks
0:5
i;r ¼ b0=Clicks
0:5
i;r þ b1 þ b2Clicks
3=2
i;r þ dr þ xi þ ui;r . Usual
econometric techniques then follow.
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Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates for the full
sample, the sub-sample with the prize of 10 and the sub-sample with the prize of 20
respectively. Note the similarity between the estimates of the parameters of the
production function in all equations. The fitted production functions for the two sub-
samples with different prizes are shown in Fig. B1 in the online supplementary
materials: the two production functions almost coincide. Furthermore, we find that
both persistent and transitory unobserved individual effects are statistically
significant, and that the transitory unobservables account for more of the variation
in clicking than the persistent individual differences.
To formally test whether the production function is invariant to different prize
levels, we proceed to estimate an augmented model by adding interactions of the
intercept, covariates Clicks0:5 and Clicks2 with a binary variable indicating whether
the prize is 10–20. We then perform a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that
the coefficients on the interaction terms are all zero. We cannot reject the null
hypothesis, indicating that the production function is stable across prize levels
(v2 3ð Þ = 4.70, p = 0.195).
To test the stability of the production function across experimental sessions, we
estimate an augmented model by adding interactions of the intercept, Clicks0:5 and
Clicks2 with a session dummy. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
production function is invariant across sessions (v2 3ð Þ = 2.60, p = 0.458). In fact
the fitted production functions are barely distinguishable.12 We summarize these
findings in the following result.
Result 2: The estimated production function, that is, the relationship between
catches and clicks, is increasing in clicks and concave. The production function is
stable across different prize levels as well as across different experimental sessions.
3.4 Comparing the predicted and actual number of clicks
With the estimated production function from model (2) and treatment parameters,
we are ready to see how quantitative predictions on clicking perform.
Table 3 compares the predicted number of clicks that is derived from Eq. (1)
given the estimated production function reported in column (1) of Table 2 and the
cost-prize parameters, with the actual number of clicks for every treatment.13 We
find that average actual clicks are very similar to the predicted number of clicks in
treatments 1, 2, 4 and 6 and near to, but statistically significantly different from,
predicted clicks in treatments 3 and 5 (subjects seem to have over-clicked in
treatments 3 and under-clicked in treatment 5).14 Thus, overall, not only did they
12 See the online supplementary materials for details of the results: Estimates of model (2) for each
session are given in Table B2 and the fitted production functions are shown in Fig. B2.
13 Note that we have assumed a continuous production function. This assumption is made mainly for
expositional and analytical convenience. In reality, the production function is a discrete relationship
between catches and clicks.
14 We also performed an out-of-sample test of predictions by comparing the actual number of clicks in an
experimental session with the predictions derived from data from the other session. The results are
essentially the same. See the online supplementary materials for details.
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change their clicking behavior in the predicted direction when incentives changed,
but also for given incentives their clicking was close, on average, to the profit
maximizing level. The results are surprising given that subjects cannot know the
production function a priori and therefore are in no position to calculate the optimal
level of clicking. Nonetheless, on average, they behaved as if they knew the
underlying structural parameters and responded to them optimally. These findings
are summarized in our next result.
Result 3: The average number of clicks is close to the point prediction in all
treatments but deviates statistically significantly from point predictions in
treatments 3 and 5.
Figure 4 shows the predicted clicks and the distribution of actual clicks by
combining categories whenever the treatments have the same predicted clicks. The
distribution of clicks is approximately centered on the predicted clicks in each case,
but shows variability in clicking for any given C/P ratio. As noted earlier, if the
marginal product of clicking is subject to individual-specific and idiosyncratic
shocks variability in clicking is to be expected.
Table 2 Panel data regressions for model (2) in study 1
Dep. var. catches Coefficient estimates (SE)
(1) full sample (2) Prize = 10 (3) Prize = 20
Intercept 10.107*** (0.230) 10.477*** (0.308) 9.405*** (0.423)
Clicks0.5 5.495*** (0.132) 5.402*** (0.216) 5.660*** (0.171)
Clicks2 -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.000)
rx 0.366*** (0.038) 0.352*** (0.045) 0.384*** (0.042)
ru 0.796*** (0.013) 0.870*** (0.021) 0.694*** (0.016)
N 1905 946 959
All period dummies are included and insignificant except for period 2 using the full sample. *** p\0.01
Table 3 Comparisons between the predicted number of clicks and the actual number of clicks
Treatment no. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prize per catch (P) 10 10 10 20 20 20
Cost per click (C) 0 5 10 0 5 10
Predicted clicks 57.4 19.5 6.9 57.4 34.5 19.5
Av. actual clicks (SD) 57.8 (12.2) 18.6 (9.44) 8.8 (5.02) 58.7 (12.5) 30.9 (15.8) 18.4 (9.80)
p-value 0.723 0.367 0.000 0.276 0.040 0.294
p values are based on two-tailed one-sample t-tests using a subject’s average clicks per treatment as the
unit of observation when testing against the predicted clicks
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In the next section, we provide further tests for the suitability of the ball-catching
task by investigating its performance in well-known experimental settings that
hitherto have typically used induced-value designs. This will be a further
opportunity to see whether the ball-catching task produces behavior that is
consistent with equilibrium comparative static or point predictions.
4 Study 2: applications—team production, gift exchange
and tournament
The previous section has demonstrated the accuracy of predictions on clicking using
the ball-catching task in an individual decision making task. In this section, we use
the ball-catching task in three classic interactive experiments that have been used to
study cooperation, reciprocity, and competition. We chose these applications for
several reasons. First, they represent important classes of experimental games using
induced value designs. Second, they allow for further tests of theoretical point
predictions and/or of comparative static predictions in interactive settings. Third,
they illustrate the versatility of the ball-catching task with regard to manipulations
of the production function and the induced values for the cost function. We will
utilize the estimated production function from Study 1 to derive predictions on
clicking whenever possible.
We ran five sessions, each with 32 subjects, for a total of 160 subjects. In each
session two unrelated treatments were conducted, each involving ten repetitions of a
task. Details of the treatments are specific to each session and will be explained
separately below. Instructions for the second treatment were given after the first
treatment was completed. At the end of each session, a post-experimental
questionnaire was administered asking for subjects’ perception of the ball-catching
task, including its difficulty, enjoyableness and boredom. All the sessions were run
at the CeDEx lab at the University of Nottingham. Sessions lasted no more than one
hour and the average earnings were around £13.00.15
Fig. 4 Distributions and kernel density distributions of the actual number of clicks and the predicted
clicks. Note the vertical line in each panel represents the predicted number of clicks
15 Four of the treatments were unrelated to this paper and are not reported. Instructions of all reported
experiments are reproduced in the online supplementary materials.
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4.1 Team production
The understanding of free-riding incentives in team production is at the heart of
contract theory and organizational economics (Holmstrom 1982). A standard
experimental framework for studying team production is the voluntary contribution
mechanism in which the socially desirable outcome is in conflict with individual
free-riding incentives (see a recent survey in Chaudhuri (2011) in the context of
public goods).
Our team production experiment was run over three sessions. One session
included a team production (TP) treatment, in which four team members worked on
the ball-catching task independently over 10 periods. The same four subjects played
as a team for the entire 10 periods. For each ball caught, the subject contributed 20
tokens to team production while he/she had to bear the cost of clicking, with a cost
per click of 5 tokens. At the end of each period, total team production was equally
shared among the four team members. Each member’s earnings were determined by
the share of the production net of the individual cost of clicking. Note that an
individual’s marginal benefit from another catch is 5 tokens, whereas the marginal
benefit accruing to the entire group is 20 tokens. The other two sessions included
control treatments where individuals play 10 periods according to a simple
individual piece-rate. In the first treatment (PR20) an individual receives a prize per
catch of 20 tokens and incurs a cost per click of 5 tokens. The second treatment
(PR5) has a prize per catch of 5 tokens and a cost per click of 5 tokens.
The amount of clicking in PR5 gives a ‘‘selfish’’ benchmark for the TP treatment,
while clicking behavior in PR20 gives an ‘‘efficiency’’ benchmark. If a subject in
the TP treatment is only concerned about her own private costs and benefits from
clicking and catching, and equates marginal costs to marginal private benefits, she
should click the same as in PR5. On the other hand, if she is concerned about total
team production and equates marginal costs to marginal social benefits, then she
should provide the same clicks as in PR20. Our hypothesis is that free-riding
incentives would drive clicking towards the selfish benchmark, as is observed in
many similar experiments using induced values (e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter
(1997) and many public goods experiments using voluntary contribution
mechanisms).
Figure 5 displays the average numbers (± 1 SEM) of clicks in the three
treatments. The two horizontal lines represent the Nash predictions on optimal
clicking levels in PR20 and PR5 respectively (using the estimated production
function from Study 1 to compute the optimal clicking levels).
The figure shows a clear declining average number of clicks over time in TP.
Average clicks decrease from 30 clicks to just above 17 clicks in the last period. By
comparison, average clicks in PR20 decrease from 38 to 32 and in PR5 from 16 to 8
and thus is consistent with our findings in Study 1. Subjects in TP under-provide
effort, relative to the efficiency benchmark, from the very first period and steadily
decrease their clicking. Even in the final period, however, average clicks exceed the
extreme selfishly optimal level. This empirical result is qualitatively similar to
previous findings from experiments using induced values, such as Nalbantian and
Schotter’s (1997) revenue sharing treatment and many public goods experiments,
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and also from some real effort experiments on team incentives (e.g., Corgnet et al.
(2015)).
4.2 Gift exchange
The gift exchange experiment (Fehr et al. 1993) examines reciprocal behavior
between subjects in the role of firms and subjects in the role of workers. The gift
exchange game using induced value techniques has been a workhorse model for
many experimental investigations of issues in labor economics and beyond (see
Ga¨chter and Fehr 2002; Charness and Kuhn 2011 for surveys).
Our version of the bilateral gift exchange experiment follows Ga¨chter and Falk
(2002), except that they used induced values whereas we use the ball-catching task
and slightly different parameters which we deem more suitable for the present
purpose. In our experiment, in each period the firm offers a wage between 0 and
1000 tokens to the matched worker who then works on the ball-catching task. Each
ball caught by the matched worker adds 50 tokens to the firm’s payoff. The worker’s
payoff is the wage minus the cost of clicking. To compensate for possible losses,
every firm and worker received 300 tokens at the beginning of each period. We
implemented the gift exchange game in two sessions, one using a treatment with
stranger matching over ten periods and the other using a treatment with partner
matching over ten periods.
We made two key changes to the task compared with the version used in Study 1.
First, we reduced the number of balls that could be caught within 60 s from 52 to 20
by increasing the time interval between falling balls. We made this change because
we wanted to reduce the influence of random shocks as much as possible. The
change makes it easy for a subject to catch every ball so that reciprocal behavior by
workers could be reflected in their clicks as well as in their actual outputs. Second,
the cost schedule was changed to a convex function in accordance with the
parameters used in most gift exchange experiments. The cost for each click is
Fig. 5 Average clicks over time in team production
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depicted in Table 4. For example, the 1st and 2nd clicks cost 5 tokens each, the 3rd
click cost 6 tokens, etc., and finally the last column with No. 30 ? means that the
30th and any further clicks cost 12 tokens each. If, for example, the worker makes a
total of three clicks she will incur a total cost of 5 ? 5 ? 6 = 16 tokens.
Based on many gift exchange experiments and in particular the results by
Ga¨chter and Falk (2002) and Falk et al. (1999) who also compared partners and
strangers in gift exchange, we expect gift exchange and predict that the reciprocal
pattern is stronger with partner matching where it is possible to build up a reputation
between a firm and a worker. Figure 6 confirms both predictions. It shows the
relationship between outputs and wages on the upper panel and the relationship
between clicks and wages on the lower panel. The data suggests a clear reciprocal
Table 4 The cost schedule in gift exchange
No. of click 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Cost 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9
No. of click 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30?
Cost 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 12
Fig. 6 Reciprocal patterns in gift exchange. The upper panel shows the relationship between outputs and
wages in both treatments and the lower panel displays the relationship between clicks and wages. The
relationship in the stranger matching treatment is shown in the left panels and in the partner matching
treatment in the right panels. The fitted lines are estimated from non-parametric lowess regressions with
the bandwidth equal to 0.8
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pattern in both treatments and an even stronger pattern in the partner treatment
whether we look at outputs or clicks.
For formal statistical tests we estimate the following random effects panel data
model for the number of clicks on the wage received:
Clicki;r ¼ b0 þ b1wagei;r þ xi þ dr þ ui;r
where xi is an individual-specific random effect identically and independently
distributed over subjects with a variance r2x, dr denotes a period dummy for the r
th
period (with the first period providing the omitted category), and ui;r is a disturbance
term, assumed to be identically and independently distributed over subjects and
periods with a variance r2u.
Table 5 reports the estimates for both treatments and also for the pooled sample
with an additional interaction term. Consistent with gift exchange reciprocity and
the graphical evidence from Fig. 6, workers in both treatments respond to higher
wages by clicking more, and the number of clicks differs systematically from zero
clicks. Furthermore, the strength of reciprocity is stronger with partners than
strangers as the interaction term between the wage received and the treatment
dummy in the column (3) is highly significant. These results in our ball-catching gift
exchange experiment are qualitatively similar to findings from induced value
experiments in Falk et al. (1999) and Ga¨chter and Falk (2002). Our results from the
stranger treatment are also consistent with an early real effort gift exchange
experiment by Gneezy (2002) who used a maze solving task (without induced
values) to measure worker’s performance, although Gneezy’s experiment was
conducted in a one-shot setting.
4.3 Tournament
Tournament incentive schemes, such as sales competitions and job promotions, are
an important example of relative performance incentives (Lazear and Rosen 1981).
Table 5 Random effects regressions for worker’s clicks in gift exchange
Dep. var.: clicks Coefficient estimates (SD)
(1) Stranger (2) Partner (3) Pooled
Wage 0.003** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.004** (0.002)
Partner 1.154 (0.797)
Wage 9 partner 0.014*** (0.003)
Intercept 3.279*** (0.681) 3.746*** (1.444) 2.200** (0.952)
rx 1.753 3.346 2.293
ru 2.649 4.397 3.972
Hausman test for random
versus fixed effects
df = 10 p = 1.000 df = 10 p = 0.956 df = 11 p = 0.984
N 160 160 320
All period dummies are statistically insignificant. Partner is a dummy which equals 1 if the treatment is
the partner matching and 0 if the stranger matching. *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05
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One early laboratory experiment by Bull et al. (1987) found that tournament
incentives indeed induced average efforts in line with theoretical predictions. But
the variance of behavior was much larger under tournament incentives than under
piece-rate incentives. Many induced value tournament experiments have been
conducted since (see Dechenaux et al. (2014) for a survey).
In one session we included a simultaneous tournament treatment. The 32 subjects
were randomly matched into pairs in a period and each pair competed in the ball-
catching task for a prize worth 1200 tokens. The winner earned 1200 tokens net of
any cost of clicking, whereas the loser received 200 tokens net of any cost of
clicking. The cost per click was always 5 tokens. Each player’s probability of
winning followed a piecewise linear success function (Che and Gale 2000; Gill and
Prowse 2012): prob{win} = (own output – opponent’s output ? 50)/100. This
procedure was repeated over 10 periods.
We use this contest success function because it allows us to make a point
prediction on the expected number of clicks. This is because the specified piecewise
linear success function implies that an additional catch increases the probability of
winning by 1/100. Thus, the marginal benefit of clicking is equal to the prize spread
between the winner prize and the loser prize, 1000, multiplied by 1/100, multiplied
by the marginal product of a click. The marginal cost of clicks is 5 tokens. Once
again, we utilize the estimated production function from Study 1 to compute the
optimal number of clicks, which turns out to be 20 clicks. Notice that while an
additional catch increases earnings by 10 tokens in treatment 2 of Study 1, here an
additional catch increases expected earnings by 10 tokens.
Figure 7 displays the average clicks (± 1 SEM) across all subjects and periods.
We observe quick convergence to the predicted clicking level. The variance of
clicks in tournament also appears to be larger than that observed in treatment 2 of
Study 1. The standard deviation of clicks is around 12 in the former and 9.4 in the
latter, perhaps reflecting the stochastic nature of the relationship between catches
Fig. 7 Average clicks over time in tournament
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and earnings under tournament incentives.16 Both results are qualitatively similar to
previous findings from Bull, et al. (1987).
5 Study 3: an online version of the ball-catching task
5.1 The ball-catching task on Amazon Mechanical Turk
As a third test of the versatility of the ball-catching task, we introduce an online
version. This online version is programmed in PHP and has been designed to
resemble the lab version as closely as possible.17 The purpose of this section is to
show the potential (and limitations) of using the ball-catching task in online
experiments, which increasingly appear to be a valuable complement to experiments
in the physical laboratory.
We ran the same experiment as in Study 1 on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk;
see the supplementary materials for instructions).18 In total, we recruited 95 subjects
from MTurk and 74 of them finished the task. Recruitment took around 10 min.
Given the unusually long duration of the task (50 min), the 78% completion rate
suggests that our promised payment is sufficiently attractive to most of the workers
on MTurk. The average payment, including a $3 participation fee, was around
$5.90, which was well above what most MTurk tasks offered. The average age was
35 years, ranging from 20 to 66 years; and 52% were male.
Paralleling the presentation of Study 1 results, Fig. 8 summarizes the distribution
and the kernel densities of the number of clicks for each treatment. In general, we
find that the comparative statics results are very similar to those in Study 1.
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test using a subject’s average clicks per treatment as the
unit of observations suggests that homogeneity of degree zero also holds here: the
difference in clicks between the two treatments with the same C/P ratio is not
systematic (p = 0.309). The same is true for the difference in clicks between the
two treatments with C = 0 (p = 0.832). Similarly, when comparing treatments with
the same prize, Friedman tests indicate that comparative static predictions for
different costs are supported (p\ 0.001 in both comparisons).
We observe some notable differences between the online and the lab version. The
variance of clicking in each treatment for MTurkers appears to be higher than in the
lab with student subjects. Moreover, we find that the production function is not
invariant to prize levels, nor is it stable across sub-samples, thus preventing us from
making meaningful point predictions.19
16 This difference in variability of clicks between tournament and piece-rate incentives is smaller than
that found by Bull et al. (1987) in their induced value experiment, in which the standard deviation of
effort under tournament incentives was more than double that under piece-rate incentives. Quantitative
comparisons between their study and ours, however, should be treated cautiously as there are numerous
differences between studies (e.g. we use a piece-wise linear contest success function, whereas they use a
rank-order tournament).
17 See the appendix for discussion of technical considerations associated with implementing the task.
18 See Horton et al. (2011) for a discussion of the usefulness of MTurk for experimental economists.
19 Analyses are available from authors upon request.
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6 Discussion
Real effort tasks have the advantage that they offer subjects something tangible to
do rather than just choosing among abstract options. The potential cost to the
experimenter is loss of control because subjects might experience unobserved
psychological benefits or costs. Thus, there is a tradeoff between ‘‘realism’’ and
experimental control. The ball-catching task mitigates this tradeoff because it allows
for a tangible activity and control over important parameters, such as the production
function and the cost function. This feature is particularly important if the
experimenter wants to test theoretical predictions, in particular, point predictions.
Existing real effort tasks typically allow at best for comparative static predictions,
but not point predictions, because the latter requires full control over all costs and
benefits, be they material or psychological.
Psychological costs and benefits always exist to some degree because any
decision environment inevitably triggers emotions and requires some cognitive
effort. Arguably, these psychological effects are stronger in real effort experiments
than in abstract induced value settings. Smith (1982) (in particular pp. 930–934) was
well aware of these non-monetary costs and benefits and argued that the ‘‘precepts’’
of induced value experiments will provide the necessary control of the experimental
environment. The precepts are non-satiation in the reward medium (money),
salience (rewards in the experiments should depend on decisions), and in particular
dominance (the ‘‘reward structure dominates any subjective costs (or values)
associated with participation in the activities of the experiment’’ (p. 934)). It is the
control over costs and benefits that renders experiments an informative tool to test
economic theories – be it an abstract induced value experiment or a real effort
experiment. Satisfying dominance may be harder to achieve in real effort
experiments than in induced value experiments.
Fig. 8 Distributions and kernel density distributions of the number of clicks in study 3
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Thus, the usefulness of the ball-catching task to test economic theories requires
that dominance holds: psychological costs and benefits should be relatively small
and dominated by pecuniary payoff considerations. In our piece-rate setting,
‘‘small’’ means that, in a statistical sense, clicks should be homogeneous of degree
zero in those costs and prizes, which the experimenter can manipulate. Our results in
Study 1 unambiguously support this requirement. Thus, the ball-catching task has
passed a first important test for its usefulness to test economic theories.
As a second test, we derived further comparative static predictions about how
clicking levels should vary with changing costs and prizes. The results strongly
support the comparative static predictions. Theory also predicts that if clicking costs
are zero, people should catch as many balls as possible and prizes should therefore
not matter, which is what we observe. Thus, the ball-catching task also passes this
second test.
The third and most demanding test is whether observed (average) behavior also
follows point predictions. This is the case and thus the ball-catching task also passes
this third test. We thus conclude from Study 1 that the ball-catching task is in
principle suitable for theory testing purposes, if the researcher thinks that for his or
her research question a design with tangible actions is desirable.
A complementary way of looking at the experiments reported in Study 1 is to see
them as a test in its own right of piece-rate incentive theory. In its most simplified
version, the first-order condition of optimal clicks under piece-rate incentives is
expressed in Eq. (1). Our experiment provides an environment to put the
comparative static predictions from (1) as well as clicking level predictions to a
test. The experimental environment controls the production process (the ball
dropping), the costs of clicking to catch balls, as well as the piece rates (the prizes)
for each catch. Tests using field data, even those that have unusually detailed data
such as Lazear (2000), typically do not have detailed information about effort costs
that are necessary to predict effort levels. The ball-catching task can accommodate
assumptions about effort costs (e.g. the cost consequences of ability differences) in
the induced cost valuations given to subjects. The ability of the ball-catching task to
control all aspects of the environment allows a complete behavioral characterization
of all predictions of piece-rate theory, not just the comparative statics. Our results
provide a comprehensive vindication of piece-rate theory.
Study 2 reported three experiments to showcase the implementation and
versatility of the ball-catching task in three classic experimental paradigms that
have been studied extensively in induced value experiments: team production, gift-
exchange, and tournaments. In all three experiments the results are closely in line
with findings from their induced value counterparts. Particularly noteworthy is that
equilibrium predictions, derived from the production function of Study 1, are
closely met in all cases where we could derive an equilibrium prediction (the piece-
rate treatments of the team production experiment, and in the tournament). We also
confirm the theoretical comparative static prediction that in the gift-exchange game
a fixed matching should lead to stronger reciprocity than random matching. We see
this as a strong encouragement for the suitability of the ball-catching task in
potentially many more settings. The chosen experiments also demonstrate the
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versatility of the ball-catching task to manipulate the production technology and the
cost function.
One central feature of the ball-catching task is its ability to control effort costs by
inducing any effort cost function the experimenter deems appropriate. Recall that
effort costs in economic models of labor supply denote any cost a worker might
incur, physiological, psychological, or simply opportunity costs of foregone leisure.
Existing real effort experiments model opportunity costs of effort by offering the
subjects outside options, for example the opportunity to surf the Internet (Corgnet
et al. 2015), to receive paid time-out for a few seconds (Mohnen et al. (2008)), to
work on other productive individual tasks (van Dijk et al. 2001), or to leave the task
earlier than the deadline (e.g., Abeler et al. (2011)). This method exploits the
possibility of a trade-off between effort and off-the-job leisure and, indeed, there is
experimental evidence that subjects make such a trade-off in response to different
incentive schemes (see Corgnet et al. 2015; Eckartz 2014; Noussair and Stoop
2015). However, compared to the ball-catching task which in its most minimal
version may take only one minute to complete, the ‘‘outside options’’ method
usually requires a rather long duration for it to work well (sometimes up to 60 min
as in Abeler et al. (2011)), thus preventing us from collecting repeated observations
in the duration of a typical laboratory experiment. Moreover, while outside options
imply some real effort costs, it is still unclear how subjects value them exactly
without the help of structural estimation of the underlying effort cost function.20 The
ability of the ball-catching task to induce any cost function, be it linear, or non-
linear as in the gift-exchange experiment discussed above (Table 4), circumvents
the problem of unknown valuations and retains the possibility of making point
predictions on effort choices.
Studies 1 and 2 reported results of experiments conducted in the physical
laboratory using z-Tree. Study 3 presented results from the online version of the
ball-catching task, conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results strongly
support the robustness of the ball-catching task with regard to all comparative statics
predictions, including the crucial requirement of homogeneity of degree zero in
C and P. This is encouraging and important support for the suitability of the ball-
catching task.
However, the results from the online experiment also serve as an important
caveat because they reveal that the environment where subjects take their decision
might matter a great deal for the actual production function. In an online
experiment, there are inevitably many differences compared to the physical
laboratory: computer configurations (e.g., screen sizes and mice), speed of network
connections, distractions in the working environment, etc. will vary strongly across
online participants, but will typically be very similar for all subjects within a given
physical laboratory. Physical labs might also differ, so the production function that
can be used for deriving point predictions might also be lab specific. Hence, an
20 An alternative way to add realism to an experiment without sacrificing ‘‘control’’ over the cost
function is to reduce the effort cost close enough to 0. For example, Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015) used the
slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012) but allowed the use of the keyboard, and derived lower bounds on
the implied effort cost. The ball-catching task with the cost-per-click equal to 0 is in fact another example.
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important lesson is that for proper calibration of the production function pre-testing
is necessary in whatever lab is used, physical or online.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the ball-catching task, a task in which subjects can use
mouse clicks to catch balls on screen, incurring material costs from each click. The
task’s greatest advantage over related real effort tasks lies in its versatility to
manipulate the production technology and in particular in its ability to control
‘effort’ costs. We presented three studies. Studies 1 and 3 showed that behavior in
the ball-catching task in an individual decision making environment follows
important comparative static predictions derived from incentive theory. Studies 1
and 2 suggest that the ball-catching task also has the potential to derive and test
point predictions although Study 3 revealed that this most demanding feature of the
ball-catching task requires careful calibration. Study 2 also showed that behavior
elicited using the ball-catching task strongly resembles behavior in experiments
using induced cost of effort designs. Together, the three studies demonstrate that the
ball-catching task is a potentially powerful tool for (theory testing) experiments in
‘‘real effort’’ environments.
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Appendix
Here, we describe the working and functionality of the ball-catching task, both the
z-Tree version and the online version, in more detail and also give suggestions about
how to implement the task in experiments. The z-Tree code is available as online
supplementary material. The online version is available from the authors upon
request.
The z-Tree code of the ball-catching task allows experimentalists to manipulate
the speed of falling balls and the time interval between falling balls directly in the
global table in z-Tree. Changes to the layout of the task, such as the number of
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columns, height and width of the task box and the falling pattern, however, require
more involved re-programming of the task. In the version used in this paper, the
falling pattern is random. There are in fact four independent balls falling within a
fixed time interval. Once a ball is caught or touches the bottom of the task box, it
will reappear in a randomly selected column and fall again.
The z-Tree version has been tested using z-Tree 3.3.8 and later versions. The
ball-falling and the tray-moving may become more sluggish with an increase in the
number of z-Leafs simultaneously running the ball-catching task. In our
experiments, we connected at most 16 z-Leafs to one z-Tree. A session with 32
subjects as in our Study 1 was accomplished by simultaneously opening two z-Trees
in two separate master computers, each of which is connected with 16 z-Leafs. By
affecting the level of sluggishness subjects may experience the number of connected
z-Leafs may affect the production function. Other factors that may affect subjects’
performance include the size of the task displayed on the specific computer screen,
pixel resolutions of computer monitors, mouse configurations, etc. It is, therefore,
advisable to test the software thoroughly in the lab where the actual experiment will
be run. This will help for calibration of the production function to allow for accurate
point predictions.
The online version of the ball-catching task can be administered using a PHP/
MySQL compatible server controlled by the experimentalist and a participant can
enter the experiment using a JAVASCRIPT-enabled browser (modern browsers
such as Firefox, Chrome, Safari and IE). As in the z-Tree version, the speed of
falling balls and the time interval between falling balls can be easily changed in the
program. The online version works differently from the z-Tree version in that there
is a ball-generating mechanism that produces each ball with a fixed time interval
from a randomly selected column. Therefore, unlike the z-Tree version, the distance
between two balls falling near to each other is always the same. Because of the
different engine behind the online version, participants typically do not experience
any sluggishness in the ball falling and tray moving, although it may happen due to
network connection issues or not fully JAVASCRIPT-compatible browsers.
The actual implementation of online experiments using this online version
requires additional considerations compared to laboratory experiments. As
discussed in the main text, performance of online participants, such as MTurkers,
may be affected by technological and environmental considerations that are not
observed by the experimenter. These include details of computer configurations
(e.g., screen sizes and mice), conditions of network connectivity, as well as
environmental distractions, etc..
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